This article analyses the use of criminal justice measures aimed at the prevention of sexual offending across England and Wales. Specifically, it focusses on measures such as the 'sex offenders register' and sexual offences prevention orders (SOPOs) and the use of sanctions for their breach. Following a discussion of the apparent tensions between individual rights and public protection measures we present an original analysis of data collated from Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangement (MAPPA) area reports over a nine-year period. Our analysis reveals considerable variation between areas in both the risk-level allocation of cases, the imposition of SOPOs and sanctions for non-compliance with MAPPA. We argue that these disparities raise issues concerning both the rights and autonomy of those subjected to public protection measures and highlight the need for further detailed research into MAPPA practices.
Introduction
Over the last two decades a raft of punitive legislation intended to manage the risks posed by 'known sexual offenders' has developed. This has included the introduction of supervisory oversight and monitoring of individuals in the community post-sentence through the 'Sex Offenders Register' 1 and Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements, or MAPPA 2 (Thomas 2011; Stone 2012) . The general trend has been for interventions to be 'strengthened', 'toughened' and 'tightened' (Thomas 2008 (Shute 2004) . Additionally, the Child Sex Offenders Disclosure Scheme allows for information about RSOs to be shared with the public through controlled disclosure (see Kemshall and Wood 2010; Kemshall et al. 2012; Chan et al. 2010 ).
Recent changes made in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 widens the use of such orders so that they can be used to manage the risk against adults as well as children. For example, a new Sexual Harm Prevention Order will replace the Sexual Offences Prevention Order and Foreign Travel Order; and the Sexual Risk Order (SRO) has replaced the Risk of Sexual Harm Order. Due to the civil nature of these orders, the standard of proof required for their imposition is based on the balance of probabilities (their jurisdictional application and related debates surrounding the subject's rights will be discussed later in the paper). They then essentially entail the use of what Kemshall and Maguire (2002:14) have termed 'negative conditions' to restrict and control the subject's behaviour in the community. All carry criminal penalties should they be breached, including up to 5 years imprisonment (Knock et al. 2002; Shute 2004) . While designed to limit and monitor the behaviour of particular individuals in the interests of public protection, the gravity of these potential consequences for RSOs clearly underscore the importance of accurately evaluating their future risk of offending.
Currently, MAPPA oversees the assessment and management of 'high risk' individuals, notably RSOs (Thomas 2011; Stone 2012) . MAPPA utilises an inter-agency approach to the operational practices involved in the risk assessment, supervision, surveillance, intervention with, enforcement, compliance, and breach of, purportedly 'high risk' cases. A three-tiered risk management system (ranging from Levels 1 to 3) is used to target resources at those perceived as posing the highest level of risk (Level 3). The risk level of the individual therefore determines the degree of restrictive, rehabilitative and protective interventions put in place to manage risk, and the extent to which information is shared between the agencies involved in MAPPA. The Home Office and latterly the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) have issued various guidance manuals to MAPPA (e.g. MoJ 2007; and subsequent evaluations of the public protection arrangements have been conducted which outline the risk management procedures used in relation to RSOs (e.g. Maguire et al. 2001; Kemshall et al. 2005; Wood and Kemshall 2007 ; see also Kemshall 2008; Wood and Kemshall 2008 ). An area of concern that has been given increasing recognition is the need for consistency in practice across the different 42
MAPPA areas in England and Wales. In particular, the need to ensure that all RSOs are allocated to the appropriate level of risk management and that the imposition and use of SOPOs during this time was appropriate. Similar concerns over consistency were also raised by Hudson et al. (2015) . These findings highlighted an uneven distribution of The primary purpose of this paper is to examine further the incidence of RSOs alongside the use and consistency of preventative measures against further offending.
Specifically this paper is interested in the use and consistency of the SOPO 5 , as well as the use of sanctions relating to the breach of SOPOs and the notification requirements.
The primary data used in this analysis were derived from the annual reports for the 42 designated MAPPA areas in England and Wales over a nine-year period, from 2004/5 to 2012/13. We have therefore been able to examine consistency in the use of SOPOs over time and geographically.
The remainder of this paper is structured in the following four ways. First, we examine in more detail a number of human rights concerns over the use of such preventative measures, specifically the notification requirements and the SOPO. Second, we describe how the data were collated and prepared for analysis. Third, we present the findings from fairly straightforward analyses of the data before, fourthly, discussing important insights into future practice and research.
Just social policies versus public protection
Numerous legislative responses have been introduced to protect the public and curb rising community concern about the release of convicted sexual offenders. Yet the rate of sexual reconviction for sexual offenders is known to be comparatively low, typically 10 per cent to 15 per cent after five years Harris and Hanson 2004; Hanson and Morton-Bourgon 2005; Hoare and Jansson 2008; Kershall et al. 2008) .
Reconviction as an outcome measure, of course, fails to take into account unofficial levels of sexual re-offending (Falshaw et al. 2003) , high attrition rates and/or difficulties in prosecution proceedings (Kelly et al. 2005; Taylor and Gassner 2010) . Accordingly researchers now recommend the use of other outcome measures to supplement reconviction data (Falshaw et al 2003) . Similarly, it is accepted that research examining repeat offending of convicted sexual offenders should also take into account the offence characteristics of different subtypes of sexual offenders (Craig et al. 2003; Smallbone et al. 2008; Finkelhor 2009; Butler et al. 2012) as well as the impact of any intervention or management strategies (Stalans 2004; Hanson et al. 2009; Brown 2010; Peck 2011; Butler et al. 2012 ) which have been shown to account for differences in recidivism rates.
Despite these methodological challenges, the observed recidivism rate is 'less than commonly believed' (Mann et al. 2010: 192) . Thus MAPPA and the associated measures that supervise, control and monitor RSOs in the community have been extensively criticised for responding to an over-exaggerated level of risk reflecting the 'Othering' of those convicted of sexual offences. This has largely been attributed to the concept of 'populist punitiveness' (Bottoms 1995: 40) in addition to the influence of the media who stand accused of inflating public awareness, concern and fear of sexual offending within the narrow stereotypes of 'stranger' and 'predator danger' (see inter Greer 2003; Brayford and Deering 2012) . Indeed, the increased policy focus on sexual offending during the 1990s led Soothill et al. (1998) to coin the phrase 'criminal apartheid' to account for the way in which sexual crimes were differentiated from other forms of offending. This trend has evidently continued with few other offence-groups 6 having been singled out in such ways (Blandford & Beech 2011) . The appropriation of criminal justice resources based on public demand and/or media recommendations (see Critcher 2002) has been extensively criticised for failing to meet the real needs of current or future victims (see Greer 2003; Kitzinger 1999 Kitzinger , 2004a Kitzinger , 2004b . Of interest to this paper, is how policies based on so-called aimed at reducing any perceived risk. These arguments can equally apply to the imposition of notification requirements. It is worth remembering that the penalty for breaching such measures is a custodial sentence of up to five years.
Whilst actuarial measures are favoured, a number of other sexual offender risk measures continue to be used. Questions therefore remain as to how to interpret different results from various risk assessment tools (Hanson and Morton-Bourgon 2009 ) and the role of professional judgment. Given the high stakes for RSOs, it is imperative that the assessments being used are as accurate as possible. It is therefore essential that research continues to examine each tool's ability to measure relative risk, the purpose of risk assessments, and the role of professional judgment, in order to ensure that restrictive measures put in place to manage those considered a higher risk of reoffending are applied fairly, consistently and only where strictly 'necessary'.
Data and methodology
The data used within this paper were derived from MAPPA annual reports. These 
Analysis of MAPPA data on 'Registered Sexual Offenders'
The following section presents findings from fairly straightforward analyses of the data which explores both the use of public protection measures over time and inter-area (in-)
consistency. (Kemshall & Wood 2008: 611) . A further positive interpretation is that high-risk RSOs are being effectively managed through MAPPA, resulting in case management decisions to reclassify them as lower risk (Hudson et al. 2015) . However, reiterating the questions posed in Hudson et al. (2015: 12); firstly, if any of these explanations were valid, would the decline in numbers be as dramatic as the analysis suggests? And secondly, why would the rate of decline vary so dramatically between MAPPA areas? Indeed, looking at this data over a nine year period (see Table 2 ) the average rate ranges from 29.64 in London down to only 4.66 in (neighbouring) Essex -or a proportion of 'higher risk' cases six times greater in London.
What is important to this study is that despite this consistent (and expected) increase in the total number of RSOs, the proportion of cases managed at Levels 2 and 3 has shown a marked decrease at the same time as a considerable increase in the rate at which SOPOs have been imposed across England and Wales. beginning to decline. Historically, a higher proportion of RSOs being subject to more intensive 'risk management' seems to bear some relation (if not a strictly 'significant' one, r=0.66, p=0.053) to the rate at which convictions and cautions for breaching the notification requirements were dispensed. It should be noted that the highest rate of convictions and cautions coincided with the period when the highest proportion of RSOs was managed at levels 2 and 3, with a lower rate observed in recent years (when far fewer RSOs were managed at these levels). From 2008/9 onward a significantly lower proportion of RSOs have been managed at the more intensive management levels 2 and 3 which may account, to some extent, for the drop in the annual rate since breaches might be being detected less often due to the more infrequent contact with police public protection units (PPUs) amongst those RSOs previously managed at levels 2 or 3.
This table also shows the rate at which level 2 and 3 RSOs were sent to custody for breaching a SOPO. The perceived increase in the rate at which custodial sentences have been passed for SOPO breaches from 2009/10 onwards is the result of a much smaller number of RSOs being managed at MAPPA levels 2 and 3. This has the effect of magnifying the rate in comparison to previous years. For this reason, it is difficult to ascertain whether responses to proven breaches have simply become more punitive or whether the reduction in the proportion of RSOs managed at levels 2 and 3 has enabled
PPUs to be more effective in their policing of compliance with SOPOs. Given these difficulties, we have not included data on sanctions for SOPO breaches in the comparisons of inter-area consistency to which we now turn.
When comparing the rate at which SOPOs were used between the 42 MAPPA areas in England and Wales across the same time period (in Table 2 ) there is also evidence of inter-area inconsistency. Teesside for example, imposed orders at an average rate of 10.74 (per 100 RSOs, per year) whilst the comparable rate for London was only 1.64.
Therefore RSOs were, on average, more than six times more likely to have been made the subject of a SOPO (which could result in their imprisonment if breached) if they lived (or were sentenced) in Teesside than if they were in London. Rather incongruously given that they were statistically least likely to be subjected to a SOPO, RSOs in London were over six times more likely to receive a conviction or caution for breaching their notification requirement (8.65 sanctions per 100 RSOs, per year) than their counterparts in Avon and Somerset who were the least likely to be sanctioned for breaches (1.32 sanctions per 100 RSOs, per year).
There was no correlation between the average rates at which SOPOs were imposed across MAPPA areas with the average rates at which RSOs were convicted or cautioned for breaching the notification requirements (r=-0.04, p=0.80). Nor was there any correlation between the average percentage of RSOs managed at the 'higher risk' levels 2 and 3 of MAPPA and the rate of breaches (r=-0.03, p=0.85). Therefore, when comparing practice across areas, higher rates of sanctions for non-compliance with notification requirements did not appear to be linked to higher use of SOPOs or higher levels of RSOs assessed as posing a greater risk to the public. Interestingly, the rates at which SOPOs were used showed a significant but moderate negative correlation (r=-0.43, p<0.01) with higher reported average percentages of RSOs managed at levels 2 and 3. The opposite relation might have been expected with more 'high risk' RSOs being associated with more orders to protect against 'serious sexual harm.'
Concluding remarks
This research has examined the incidence of RSOs and the use of civil prevention orders with the intention of examining the extent to which these measures are being used A number of tentative arguments have been put forward to account for this variation.
For example, the variation in the way that risk is being assessed most likely reflects institutional differences (see also Hudson et al. 2015) . The imposition of a SOPO, similarly, appears to be strongly influenced by localised preference across MAPPA areas, rather than due to the risk management level to which RSOs have been allocated
there. Both explanations may reflect the cost of resourcing MAPPA practices over time.
Resourcing issues could, for example, account for the apparent downwards trend in the use of higher risk categories in the risk level allocation. Our data certainly raises questions as to whether the increase in the rate at which SOPOs have been used reflects the problem of shrinking resources and a need to find a more efficient and/or cheaper alternative to 'managing' RSOs previously monitored at MAPPA levels two and three.
Clearly a limitation of using this kind of data and approach is that such explanations can only be considered to be proxies for the underlying variations. Only further detailed research, such as that undertaken in the USA (for example, Tewksbury & Mustaine 2013) , which includes local analysis, taking into account direct comparisons of offender types and practitioner attitudes and decisions across MAPPA areas would reveal this.
However, the tentative findings presented here would suggest that further exploration and study of these issues is warranted. Crucially, we would argue that this is necessary from a human rights perspective. To reiterate, the level of risk at which a RSO is managed has implications in terms of their rights and autonomy, determining both the degree of restrictive, rehabilitative and protective interventions put in place to manage risk, and the extent to which information is shared between agencies involved in MAPPA. The apparent variations in the risk-level allocation of RSOs reinforce existing concerns surrounding the accuracy and predictability of different risk assessment tools and professional decision making techniques. The variation in the rates of level 2 and 3
RSOs and the use of SOPOs between MAPPA areas suggests an acceptability and/or tolerance of 'false positive' outcomes, which disregard an RSO's basic rights (Ericson, 2007; Hebenton and Seddon, 2009) . While MAPPA guidance aims to negate any bias, our data clearly questions whether the guidance is clear enough to ensure that all MAPPA areas follow it in the same way.
Human rights concerns become even more pertinent when you consider the punishment for non-compliance with crime prevention measures such as SOPOs and the notification requirements. Indeed, while the compliance rate for registration is high, this may actually reflect the fact that breach of notification requirements is an offence in its own right, attracting up to five years imprisonment. Similarly, breach of court orders can demand the same sentence. While our data shows that the number of RSOs convicted or cautioned for breaching the notification requirements has declined, the apparent variations between the proportion of RSOs managed at MAPPA levels 2 and 3 and the sanctions for non-compliance in each MAPPA area, raises questions about fairness and legitimacy. order to protect children and adults from sexual abuse. While this paper comes from the same purposive starting point, it raises questions over the precautionary logic that may be driving such decisions. More importantly, it recognises that while there is clearly a need to protect the public from sexual abuse and to ensure that the legislation covers all eventualities, the measures administered need to be reasonable, proportionate, just or if nothing else, appropriately targeted rather than universally applied.
It is therefore imperative that we have accurate data on MAPPA Practice. At the very least, our findings remind us that the practices of managing (and controlling) RSOs are a social process and are thus susceptible to variations in those practices which may not necessarily reflect their intended design and guidance. The level of variations in practice shown in this paper supports the need for further research into the consistency of MAPPA practice to ensure that the need to manage RSOs is matched appropriately to an accurate prediction of future risk. 2007; MoJ 2007; . MAPPA involves a tiered system of risk management of registered sexual offenders (category 1), violent offenders (category 2) and 'other dangerous offenders' (category 3) at Level 1 (low/medium risk), Level 2 (high risk) or Level 3 (critical risk). For more information see MoJ (2007; . 3 These regulations increased the amount of information that RSOs are obliged to provide to the police as part of the notification requirements under the Act. 4 We are not uncritical of the use of the term 'offender' in relation to individuals who are not necessarily still involved in criminal offending and therefore use the term RSO within this paper merely due to its use as a category within the official MAPPA documentation. 5 The SOPO has since been replaced by the SHPO. Other civil orders discussed do not form part of our analysis as they are used comparatively rarely. 6 Although 'Claire's Law', a national domestic violence disclosure scheme, has now been implemented for violent offenders (see Strickland 2013 
